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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal, we are asked to construe 18 U.S.C.S 666, 
a criminal provision entitled "Theft or bribery concerning 
programs receiving Federal funds" ("the Act" or "the 
statute"). Appellant James J. Zwick claims that the District 
Court misinterpreted the statute when it upheld his three- 
count conviction for bribery under S 666(a)(1)(B) without 
proof of a connection between the offense conduct and 
federal funds or programming. We conclude that the 
District Court erred in interpreting the statute in this 
respect and will therefore remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. Zwick also challenges the 
District Court's failure to reduce his offense level by an 
additional point for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1(b). Because we find that the District Court 
erred in its application of this Guideline provision, we will 
vacate this aspect of the sentencing order and direct the 
District Court on remand to award the additional one-point 
reduction if it determines that Zwick timely provided 
complete information to the government or timely notified 
the government of his intent to plead guilty to enable the 
government and court to conserve their resources.1 
 
I. 
 
Appellant James J. Zwick was an elected member of the 
Ross Township Board of Commissioners, the governing 
body of Ross Township, Pennsylvania. Zwick and his fellow 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We reject Zwick's remaining challenges to the application of the 
statute to his particular situation, as we discuss more fully below. 
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commissioners made policy decisions for the Township, 
including fixing salary levels, executing contracts, 
authorizing bids, and adopting budgets. In November of 
1997, the government accused Zwick of abusing his 
position to obtain illegal benefits and filed afive-count 
indictment charging him with three counts of theft or 
bribery concerning federal programs under 18 U.S.C.S 666, 
one count of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. SS 2 & 1341, and 
one count of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. SS 2 & 1344. The 
District Court had jurisdiction over Zwick's case pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. S 3231. 
 
Initial efforts at negotiating a guilty plea failed when the 
government declined to accept a conditional plea, which 
would have preserved Zwick's legal challenge to the 
application of S 666 when there is no connection between a 
defendant's conduct and federal funds or programming. 
After declining to accept the plea, the governmentfiled a 
superseding indictment, which contained all of the charges 
in the original indictment, and added another count of theft 
or bribery under S 666, another count of bank fraud, and 
three more counts of mail fraud. Again, Zwick was willing 
to plead guilty to the bank fraud and mail fraud counts, 
but continued to seek a conditional guilty plea on the S 666 
counts. During a status conference on January 27, 1998, 
Zwick informed the District Court of his intention to plead 
guilty to the fraud counts, and the District Court scheduled 
the plea hearing for February 2, 1998. Further plea 
negotiations were derailed, however, when articles appeared 
in the Pittsburgh Post Gazette and North Hills News Record 
on January 28, 1998 and January 29, 1998, declaring that 
Zwick would plead guilty to the fraud charges. Zwickfiled 
a motion with the District Court to dismiss the indictment 
based on prosecutorial misconduct, alleging that, by 
providing information for the articles, the government had 
violated its obligation to refrain from making extrajudicial 
statements regarding the possibility of a guilty plea. The 
District Court denied Zwick's motion. Zwick ultimately 
entered a guilty plea to the fraud counts on March 9, 1998. 
 
The case against Zwick on the S 666 charges proceeded 
to trial on March 10, 1998, after a brief continuance so that 
Zwick could enter treatment for his gambling addiction. 
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Although Zwick waived his right to a jury trial and 
requested a bench trial, the government opposed this 
request, so the case was tried to a jury. Zwick was 
convicted on counts one, two, and three of the four S 666 
charges. 
 
Because Zwick makes several challenges to the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction under 
S 666, we will review the relevant facts adduced at trial 
regarding the alleged bribes. In count one, the government 
alleged that Zwick solicited a bribe from Christopher Kaclik, 
the owner and developer of the Shannopin Square II office 
building located in Ohio Township. Kaclik first became 
associated with Zwick in 1994, when he applied for sewer 
access for the predecessor to Shannopin Square II, 
Shannopin Square I. At that time, Kaclik testified that 
Zwick told him "anything you need to get done in the 
Township of Ross, I can help you out." In May or June of 
1996, during the building of Shannopin Square II, Zwick 
met with Kaclik at the development site and offered to 
secure the necessary votes for approval of the sewer taps in 
exchange for a donation to the "Men's Summer League for 
Ross Township," a basketball league run by Zwick. Kaclik 
wrote a check for $5,000, made out to "James Zwick," with 
a notation reading "Men's Summer League 1996 
Basketball." At Zwick's suggestion, Kaclik also provided 
Zwick with a blank check for $7,500, which Zwick falsely 
represented he would put toward the $17,500 required to 
reserve the sewer taps. When Kaclik discovered that Zwick 
had personally endorsed and cashed the checks, he asked 
that Zwick return the money. After repeated phone calls to 
Zwick, Kaclik received $2,500 from Zwick. 
 
Count two involved Zwick's dealings with the Fosnights, 
who had obtained an option on property in Zwick's ward in 
Ross Township to build and operate an assisted living 
facility there. To complete their project, the Fosnights were 
required to obtain approval from the Ross Township Board 
of Commissioners for various permits, including a 
conditional use permit and site plan approval. On 
September 9, 1996, after the Township Planning 
Commission had already recommended approval of the 
conditional use permit, the Board of Commissioners voted 
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to table the permit for further investigation. After that 
meeting, Zwick contacted Tim Fosnight and set up a 
meeting with him and his brother Aaron at the project site. 
Zwick offered to help them obtain the required permits in 
exchange for a $15,000 donation to construct a playground 
on the grounds of his "pet" project, North Hills Affordable 
Housing ("NHAH"). Zwick explained that he could require 
the Fosnights to pay for a new traffic light and traffic 
studies, which could involve significant costs of up to 
$100,000 and lead to considerable delay, but he would not 
do so if such a "donation" was made. 
 
The Fosnights made four payments to Zwick totaling 
$10,500. Zwick directed them to make out the first two 
checks to "CSC"2 and "Cash" totaling $4,500. Zwick cashed 
both, and the funds were never received by NHAH. The next 
two checks, totaling $6,000, were made out to NHAH. 
Nonetheless, upon receipt of the funds, Judith Eakin, 
Director of NHAH, wrote Zwick two checks for $6,000 as 
payment for the telephone system Zwick was installing for 
NHAH, the project Zwick told the Fosnights their 
contribution would fund. Two months later, Zwick informed 
Eakin that more money was needed to purchase equipment 
that would complete the telephone system. When Eakin 
told Zwick that NHAH had no additional funds available for 
the telephone system, as no additional funds were in hand, 
Zwick assured Eakin that a further donation would be 
forthcoming from the Fosnights, and that, if the anticipated 
donation were not to be received in timely fashion, Zwick 
would personally guarantee the sum in question. In 
reliance on Zwick's personal guarantee, Eakin was 
authorized by her board president to advance Zwick the 
money required to purchase the equipment. Accordingly, in 
the ensuing two weeks, Eakin issued Zwick two checks 
totaling $7,440 made out to "Jim Zwick" as payment for the 
phone system. Shortly thereafter, Eakin agreed to issue 
Zwick two "replacement" checks for $7,740 when Zwick 
informed her that his accountant said the earlier checks 
should have been issued to his company, Jim Zwick 
Communications Systems, and not to him personally. 
Although Zwick provided Eakin with a check for $7,740 to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. CSC is an abbreviation for the name of Zwick's company. App. 427. 
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replace the check issued to him personally, when NHAH 
attempted to cash it, it was returned from the bank due to 
an irregular signature. NHAH never received these funds. 
 
Zwick provided the Fosnights with a traffic study from 
his office so they would not have to finance their own, and 
the Fosnights did not make a contribution to the costs of 
constructing a traffic light. Zwick voted for the approval of 
the Fosnights' conditional use permit. He also moved to 
approve the Fosnights' final site permit but abstained from 
voting on it, explaining that he might put a bid on the 
telephone work for the project and did not want to create 
the appearance of a conflict of interest. 
 
Count three charged that Zwick had solicited bribes from 
Justin Ruff, the owner of Admiral Lawn Service, when he 
asked Ruff for "performance bonds" in exchange for 
ensuring that Ruff was awarded landscaping contracts with 
Ross Township. Although bonds were required for contracts 
over $10,000, Ross Township commissioners were not 
authorized to solicit or accept them, and certainly not 
entitled to cash them. Performance bonds were supposed to 
be kept in escrow and returned once the project was 
complete. In the summer of 1996, Ruff gave Zwick two 
blank checks for $3,500 in connection with a landscaping 
contract in Denny Park, Ross Township. Although Ruff was 
awarded the contract and performed the work, his checks 
were never returned to him; Zwick had cashed them and 
kept the proceeds. Zwick eventually repaid Ruff after Ruff 
repeatedly asked him to do so. Zwick continued to solicit 
bribes from Ruff in connection with various projects, 
including $4,500 for a $45,000 project that included 
cutting grass and dragging ball fields in Ross Township. 
Ruff repeatedly refused to pay Zwick after becoming aware 
that Zwick's requests violated Ross Township's policy 
regarding performance bonds. 
 
After he was convicted on the three counts, Zwick filed a 
motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 29. The District Court denied the 
motion on October 5, 1998. The Probation Office prepared 
a Presentence Investigation Report recommending that 
Zwick be awarded a two-point reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1(a). However, the 
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Probation Office Report did not recommend awarding the 
extra one-point reduction available under S 3E1.1(b) 
because the government had to prepare for trial on the 
bribery counts. The District Court found that the Probation 
Office's conclusion was a reasonable one "[b]ased on the 
unusual circumstances and procedural posture of this 
case." The District Court also considered that Zwick raised 
factual issues at trial, rather than limiting himself to legal 
arguments. The District Court sentenced Zwick to 
concurrent terms of thirty-three months as to each count, 
to be followed by five years of supervised release. Zwick 
filed the instant appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. 
 
Zwick contends that the evidence as to all three counts 
of his S 666 conviction is insufficient because the 
government failed to prove the existence of any connection 
between his conduct and federal funds or programming. 
Specifically, he argues that S 666 requires such a 
connection, or, alternatively, that the statute is 
unconstitutional as applied to him. We exercise plenary 
review over questions of statutory interpretation. See United 
States v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 126, 128 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
The federal bribery statute at issue, 18 U.S.C.S 666, 
provides in pertinent part: 
 
       S 666. Theft or bribery concerning progr ams 
       receiving Federal funds 
 
       (a) Whoever, if the circumstance described in 
       subsection (b) of this section exists -- 
 
       (1) being an agent of an organization, or of a Sta te, 
       local, or Indian tribal government, or any agency 
       thereof -- 
 
       . . . . 
 
        (B) corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of 
       any person, or accepts or agrees to accept, 
       anything of value from any person, intending to be 
       influenced or rewarded in connection with any 
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       business, transaction, or series of transactions of 
       such organization, government, or agency involving 
       anything of value of $5,000 or more; 
 
        . . . . 
 
       shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more 
       than 10 years, or both. 
 
       (b) The circumstance referred to in subsection (a)  of 
       this section is that the organization, government, or 
       agency receives, in any one year period, benefits in 
       excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a 
       grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or 
       other form of Federal assistance. 
 
Prior to the enactment of S 666 in 1984, the limited scope 
of the federal bribery statute and general theft of property 
statute hampered the federal government's efforts to reach 
crimes affecting federal interests due to tracing 
requirements and limitations on application to non-federal 
employees. See 18 U.S.C. SS 201, 641. By its terms, S 666 
fills these particular voids; it imposes no title or tracing 
requirements and covers non-federal employees. The 
government only must prove the basic elements of the S 666 
offense. However, as Zwick's challenge reveals, the law is 
unsettled as to what S 666 requires. In Salinas v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 52, 118 S. Ct. 469, 475 (1997), the 
Supreme Court resolved one significant issue, namely, that 
the government need not show federal funds actually were 
involved in or affected by an alleged bribery transaction. 
Yet, the Court specifically left open the question before us, 
that is, to what extent the statute "requires some other 
kind of connection between a bribe and the expenditure of 
federal funds." Id. at 474. We had prior occasion in this 
Circuit to examine the scope of S 666, see United States v. 
Cicco, 938 F.2d 441, 444 (3d Cir. 1991), but we have not 
addressed the specific question before us in this case. It is 
instructive to review the approaches taken by federal courts 
that have considered the extent to which S 666 requires a 
relationship between the offense conduct and federal funds 
or programs. 
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A. Pre-Salinas 
 
Prior to Salinas, courts evaluated the requisite 
relationship under S 666 between a corrupt act and federal 
funds or programming from a number of different 
perspectives. Several courts viewed the statute's"plain 
language" as lacking any requirement, either implicitly or 
as an element of the offense, that the government prove 
federal money was directly involved in, or traceable in some 
way to, the corrupt transaction. Bolstering their view was 
the rationale that Congress sought to "cast a broad net" in 
protecting the integrity of agencies receiving federal funds 
and thus enacted S 666 with the specific intent to eliminate 
any tracing requirements that previously had obstructed 
prosecution efforts. See United States v. Westmoreland, 841 
F.2d 572, 576-578 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that direct 
involvement of federal funds in transaction is not an 
essential element of bribery charge under S 666); see also 
United States v. Pretty, 98 F.3d 1213, 1218-1219 (10th Cir. 
1996) (finding that the defendant was chargeable under 
S 666 even if actual money could not be traced to a federal 
program); United States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266, 1288-89 
(11th Cir. 1996) (agreeing with Westmoreland that S 666 
does not require that the government trace the flow of 
federal funds to a particular project); United States v. 
Valentine, 63 F.3d 459, 464-65 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
government does not need to prove that the 
misappropriated funds actually came from a federal 
program in a theft case); United States v. Simas, 937 F.2d 
459, 463 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the government 
was not required to trace federal funds to the project at 
issue to establish a S 666 violation). 
 
Interpreting a different subsection of S 666, others held 
that the program touched by bribery need not be the direct 
and actual recipient of $10,000 per year in federal funds. 
See United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 109-110 (2d Cir. 
1993) (finding that S 666 lacks any requirement that the 
program at issue be the actual recipient of federal funds); 
United States v. Little, 889 F.2d 1367, 1369 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(same). 
 
When asked to uphold convictions or find defendants 
guilty with no proof of a federal interest in the corrupt act, 
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however, some courts were reluctant to do so. See United 
States v. Foley, 73 F.3d 484, 488-493 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(reversing Foley's conviction after government did not prove 
that corruption in some way touched on federal funds); 
United States v. Frega, 933 F. Supp. 1536, 1540-1541 (S.D. 
Cal. 1996) (dismissing indictment for failure to allege that 
"federal funds were corruptly administered, were in danger 
of being corruptly administered, or even could have been 
corruptly administered."). Courts in this camp expressed 
concern that interpreting S 666 to have no federal interest 
requirement would make a federal offense out of routine 
local bribery, dramatically changing the state-federal 
balance without an express Congressional directive that it 
intended to do so. See Frega, 933 F. Supp. at 1540. 
 
Courts finding that a federal connection is required were 
comfortable reaching this result even though they agreed 
that S 666 does not require tracing of funds or proof of an 
effect on federal funds and programs. For example, the 
Ninth Circuit's holding in Simas, that tracing is not 
required, did not prevent the District Court for the 
Southern District of California from concluding in Frega 
that S 666 requires a federal connection. Likewise, the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held thatS 666 
does not require that the corrupt act actually affected 
federal funds in United States v. Bonito, 57 F.3d 167, 172- 
173 (2d Cir. 1995), but concluded in a subsequent case 
that S 666 does require proof that the corruption has some 
connection with federal funds. See Foley, 73 F.3d at 493. A 
circuit split was created between the Second and Fifth 
Circuits when the Fifth Circuit held that a defendant's 
conduct fell within S 666 without specifically requiring a 
connection between the corrupt act and the federal funds, 
other than the fact that the accepters of the bribes were 
local government agents with duties relating to a federally- 
funded program. See United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 
1185, 1203 (5th Cir. 1996), aff'd, Salinas v. United States, 
118 S. Ct. at 474.3 Neither Foley nor Marmolejo was a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Marmolejo and Foley also parted ways regarding how to determine 
whether the transactions at issue are equal to or greater than $5,000 in 
value. 
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unanimous decision.4 
 
B. Salinas 
 
On certiorari from the Fifth Circuit's Marmolejo decision, 
the Supreme Court did not resolve the broad question 
before us of whether defendants can be prosecuted under 
S 666 absent a federal interest in the offense conduct, but 
instead addressed the narrower question of whether S 666 
applies only when the bribe has a demonstrated effect on 
federal funds. Salinas, 118 S. Ct. at 472. 5 The Court found 
that the statute's "expansive, unqualified language, both as 
to the bribes forbidden and the entities covered, does not 
support the interpretation that federal funds must be 
affected to violate S 666(a)(1)(B)." Id. at 473. The Court 
acknowledged that it could depart from a statute's clear 
language upon an extraordinary showing of contrary 
intentions in the legislative history. See United States v. 
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985). However, because the 
statute was enacted to expand the application of federal 
bribery provisions to non-federal employees, the Court 
found that it would be "incongruous" to restrict S 666 so 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In the Foley dissent, Judge Lumbard argued, in essence, that there is 
no federal connection requirement. Foley 73 F.3d at 494-497 (Lumbard, 
J., dissenting). Rather, the plain language of S 666 simply outlaws bribes 
to agents of organizations that receive federal funds: "It is sufficient 
that 
Foley was an agent of a government that received $10,000 in federal 
funds and that he took a bribe involving something worth at least 
$5,000." Id. at 495. Taking the opposite view in the Marmolejo dissent, 
Judge Jolly endorsed the Second Circuit majority's reasoning in Foley; 
he argued that the Marmolejo majority misinterpreted its earlier decision 
in Westmoreland, on which it relied, and that S 666 was not intended to 
criminalize all acts of bribery involving entities that happened to 
receive 
some federal funding. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d at 1201-1204 (Jolly, J., 
dissenting). 
 
5. Salinas, a deputy sheriff for Hidalgo County, Texas, was convicted 
under S 666 for accepting benefits from a federal prisoner in his custody 
in exchange for allowing the prisoner to have "contact visits" with his 
wife and girlfriend. See Marmolejo, 89 F.3d at 1191. Hidalgo County had 
an agreement with the federal government to house federal prisoners in 
exchange for grants for improving its prison as well as payment per day 
for each federal prisoner housed. Id. 
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that it applies only when a demonstrated effect on federal 
funds is shown. Salinas, 118 S. Ct. at 473. Significantly, 
the Court found only that the "text of S 666(a)(1)(B) is 
unambiguous on the point under consideration here." Id. at 
475 [emphasis added]. The Court did not reach a holding 
on whether another kind of federal connection was required 
under S 666, believing that the facts of Salinas' case 
presented a sufficient connection: 
 
       We need not consider whether the statute requires 
       some other kind of connection between a bribe and the 
       expenditure of federal funds, for in this case the bribe 
       was related to the housing of a prisoner in facilities 
       paid for in significant part by federal funds themselves. 
       And that relationship is close enough to satisfy 
       whatever connection the statute might require. 
 
Id. at 474. The Court accordingly rejected a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the provision, at least as applied to 
Salinas: 
 
       Furthermore, there is no serious doubt about the 
       constitutionality of S 666(a)(1)(B) as applied to the facts 
       of this case. Beltran was without question a prisoner 
       held in a jail managed pursuant to a series of 
       agreements with the Federal Government. The 
       preferential treatment accorded to him was a threat to 
       the integrity and proper operation of the federal 
       program. Whatever might be said about S 666(a)(1)(B)'s 
       application in other cases, the application of 
       S 666(a)(1)(B) to Salinas did not extend federal power 
       beyond its proper bounds. 
 
Id. at 475. 
 
C. Post-Salinas 
 
Courts clearly have recognized that Salinas left open the 
question of whether S 666 requires that a federal interest be 
implicated by the offense conduct. See United States v. 
Dakota, 188 F.3d 663 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that in 
Salinas, "the nature of any necessary connection is left 
unanswered"); United States v. Santopietro, 166 F.3d 88, 93 
(2d Cir. 1999) (finding that the Supreme Court "was careful 
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to note that the statute survived the constitutional as- 
applied challenge because the benefit obtained by means of 
the bribe -- the preferential treatment -- `was a threat to 
the integrity and proper operation of the federal 
program.' "). Therefore, Salinas has not prevented courts 
from reaching conflicting conclusions on whether S 666 
requires proof of a federal interest in the offense conduct. 
The Sixth Circuit held post-Salinas that S 666 does not 
require proof of a connection between the offense conduct 
and federal funds or programming. See Dakota, 188 F.3d at 
668 (finding no connection requirement based on its 
determination in its pre-Salinas decision in Valentine, a 
theft case, and providing no additional case cites or 
reasoning). Taking the opposite view, the Second Circuit 
held that its holding in Foley -- that some federal 
connection was required -- remained good law post- 
Salinas. See Santopietro, 166 F.2d at 93. The District Court 
of Massachusetts determined post-Salinas that S 666 was 
unconstitutional as applied to the defendant in that case, 
reasoning that the conduct at issue was not related to a 
legitimate national problem as required by South Dakota v. 
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987) and thus Congress 
exceeded its bounds under the spending clause. See United 
States v. McCormack, 31 F. Supp.2d 176 (D. Mass. 1998).6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Judge Gertner comprehensively evaluated whether "S 666 give[s] 
federal authorities a blank check to prosecute ostensibly significant acts 
of corruption involving the Malden Police Department just because the 
department receives a certain level of federal funds." Id. at 181. While 
expressing the view that the relevant language inS 666(a)(1)(B), "in 
connection with any business or transaction," is ambiguous and requires 
an examination of legislative history, id. at 186 (citing Foley, 73 F.3d 
at 
490 - 492 and Frega, 933 F. Supp. at 1543), Judge Gertner concluded 
that Salinas foreclosed her from so ruling based on Salinas' holding that 
S 666(a)(1)(B) is clear and unambiguous. McCormack, 31 F. Supp.2d at 
186. Yet, the Court acknowledged that Salinas expressly left open the 
possibility that S 666(a)(1)(B) is unconstitutional as applied to cases 
that 
lack some connection between the corrupt activity and federal funds or 
programming. The Court also found McCormack's prosecution under 
S 666 deficient in another respect relating to the "$5,000 value" 
requirement. Id. at 189. 
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III. 
 
Zwick asks us to add our voice to the chorus of opinions 
regarding the need to prove that a federal interest was 
implicated by corrupt acts in a S 666 prosecution. To reach 
our own determination of whether S 666 requires such 
proof, we begin by examining the statutory language itself. 
See Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 233 
(3d Cir. 1998) (evaluating the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act) (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 
489 U.S. 235 (1989)). 
 
Section 666(a)(1)(B) requires proof that a bribe was given 
"in connection with" any business or transaction of an 
agency described in subsection (b), namely those receiving 
funds under certain federal assistance programs. The 
language does not state explicitly that the government must 
show a connection between the bribe and federal interests. 
Yet, the title of S 666, "Theft or bribery concerning 
programs receiving Federal funds," implies that a federal 
connection is anticipated, as does the statute's reference 
only to "agents" of entities receiving federal funds who 
accept bribes "in connection with" the business of the 
organization receiving federal funds. 
 
The wording of this statute is far from straightforward in 
many respects. Our reading of the statute, and the struggle 
of other courts to construe its meaning, lead us to conclude 
that S 666 can hardly be described as "plain to anyone 
reading the Act." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 
(1991) (interpreting Federal Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act).7 The only thing plain about the statute is 
that it yields two plausible alternative interpretations on 
the issue raised by Zwick. While noting that the fact 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We find that nothing in Salinas prevents us from determining that 
S 666(a)(1)(B) is ambiguous on the issue of whether there is a federal 
connection requirement, thus we disagree with the determination on this 
point reached by the District Court in McCormack. See McCormack, 31 
F. Supp.2d at 186 (finding that "Salinas has shut off this avenue of 
analysis."). Salinas found S 666(a)(1)(B) clear and unambiguous only on 
the question of whether the government must prove that the corrupt 
activity had a demonstrated effect on federal funds or programming. 
Salinas, 118 S. Ct. at 475. 
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pattern in Salinas satisfied any federal connection test that 
S 666 might require, the Supreme Court pointedly skirted 
the issue of whether the statute clearly mandated such a 
connection, suggesting that the possibility of more than one 
interpretation is valid. The most literal interpretation -- 
that the statute lacks a federal connection requirement -- 
is troubling from an interpretative standpoint in that it 
broadens the range of activity criminalized by the statute 
and alters the existing balance of federal and state powers 
by encompassing acts already addressed under state law in 
which the federal government may have little interest. We 
cannot embrace such a broad reading of this federal 
criminal law unless that is the clear directive from 
Congress. Given the statute's ambiguity on this question, 
we will consult the legislative history. See Director, Office of 
Workers' Compensation Programs v. Sun Ship, Inc., 150 
F.3d 288, 291 (3d Cir. 1998); Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 233. 
 
Before proceeding further, it is worth reviewing our prior 
analysis of S 666, albeit on a different issue, in United 
States v. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 444. In Cicco , we considered 
whether S 666 is sufficiently broad to cover the solicitation 
of election day services in exchange for municipal  
employment.8 On appeal, we recognized that the statutory 
language could be construed literally to cover Cicco's 
conduct, but found that "the language of the drafters of 
S 666 is also consistent with an intention of focusing solely 
on offenses involving theft or bribery" in a classic sense. 
Cicco, 938 F.2d at 444. Thus, we found that the statute 
was ambiguous and turned to the legislative history. Id.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The District Court entered a judgment of acquittal in Cicco after 
determining that Congress did not intend S 666 to apply to Cicco's 
actions and that the government's interpretation of the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague and deprived Cicco of fair notice. Id. at 444. 
9. In outlining our approach in Cicco, we stated that examining the reach 
of a federal criminal statute requires close attention to statutory 
language, legislative history, and purpose to strictly determine the scope 
of forbidden conduct. Id. (citing Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 
213 (1985)). We learned through our legislative history review in Cicco 
that Congress enacted S 666 to "protect federal funds by authorizing 
federal prosecution of thefts and embezzlement from programs receiving 
substantial federal support even if the property no longer belonged to the 
federal government . . . [and] to enlarge and clarify the class of persons 
subject to the federal bribery laws" to go beyond only those who can be 
considered federal public officials. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 445 (citations 
omitted). 
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As in Cicco, we now face a choice between a highly literal 
interpretation -- that no federal interest requirement is 
specifically set forth in the statute -- and a plausible, albeit 
more contextual, alternative. Thus, as in Cicco, we will refer 
to the legislative history for assistance in determining what 
Congress intended. See Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 233.10 
 
The legislative history of S 666 explains that the statute 
was enacted to correct deficiencies in existing law by 
"creat[ing] new offenses to augment the ability of the United 
States to vindicate significant acts of theft, fraud, and 
bribery involving Federal monies that are disbursed to 
private organizations or State and local governments 
pursuant to a Federal program." S. REP. NO. 98-225, 369- 
370 (1984) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1984 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Examination of and references to the legislative history are not 
uncommon among the decisions that analyze S 666. The Supreme Court 
in Salinas referred to Congress' intentions in enacting S 666, although it 
did not review or cite Congressional reports directly. See Salinas, 118 S. 
Ct. at 474 (recounting Congress's intent in enactingS 666 based on a 
"chronology [of case law] and the statutory language" and rejecting 
Salinas' interpretation of the legislative history). See also Bonito, 57 
F.3d 
at 172 (citing legislative history noted by Bonito and ultimately 
rejecting 
Bonito's arguments); Valentine, 63 F.3d at 463 (reviewing legislative 
history to determine whether it supported Valentine's argument); 
Westmoreland, 841 F.2d at 576-577 (reviewing legislative history " `as an 
additional tool of analysis' with the recognition that our inquiry will 
result in `a limitation on the plain meaning of the statutory language' 
only under exceptional circumstances") (quoting Garcia v. United States, 
469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984)); Frega, 933 F. Supp. at 1542-1543 (reviewing 
legislative history after finding statute ambiguous because interpretation 
not requiring federal connection would alter federal-state balance absent 
a clear Congressional directive). Courts interpreting subsection (b) have 
followed a similar course. See United States v. LaHue, 170 F.3d 1026, 
1030 (10th Cir. 1999) ("Like other courts that have wrestled with an 
interpretation of section 666(b), we look to the legislative history and 
the 
underlying purpose of the statute for guidance"); United States v. 
Copeland, 143 F.3d 1439, 1442 (11th Cir. 1998) (having reached the 
conclusion on a "plain reading of S 666(b), we normally would not engage 
in any additional analysis. However, since some circuits have found 
S 666(b) to be ambiguous on its face, it is worth noting that our 
conclusion is consistent with the statute's legislative history."); Coyne, 
4 
F.3d at 109 (reviewing legislative history regarding whether program at 
issue must be actual recipient of federal funds). 
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U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3510-11. A similar expectation is 
reflected in the stated purpose of the statute, described as 
protecting the integrity of vast sums of money distributed 
through Federal programs from theft, fraud, and undue 
influence by bribery. Indeed, the title of the relevant section 
of this portion of the legislative history, "Program Fraud 
and Bribery," suggests that Congress envisioned that a 
federally funded program would be the target or victim of 
the corrupt activity punishable under S 666. 
 
There is no doubt that the legislative history promotes a 
broad interpretation of the term "Federal program involving 
a grant, a contract, a subsidy, a loan, a guarantee, 
insurance, or another form of Federal assistance" to 
supplement the application of federal bribery and theft 
statutes. S. REP. NO. 98-225, 369-370. However, those gaps 
to be filled by this statute relate to elements in the federal 
bribery and theft statutes that increased the difficulty of 
reaching crimes in which there was a real federal interest. 
Under the theft of federal property statute, 18 U.S.C. S 641, 
the federal government could prosecute only when it could 
establish that the stolen property was property of the 
United States, which often was impossible if title had 
passed before the property was stolen or when federal 
funds were so commingled with non-federal funds that the 
federal character of those funds could not be shown. 
Perhaps more relevant for our purposes was the federal 
bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. S 201, which was construed to be 
inapplicable to some or all employees of private 
organizations receiving federal funds, making it more 
difficult for federal authorities to prosecute bribery even 
when federal interests were at stake. The goal was to 
overcome impediments to reaching actions in which there 
was a federal interest, not to federalize crimes in which a 
federal interest was lacking. 
 
Not surprisingly, the Senate Report notes that the intent 
of the statute is "to reach thefts and bribery in situations 
of the types involved in the Del Toro, Hinton, and Mosley 
cases cited herein," three cases in which the corrupt 
transaction clearly implicated federal interests. S. REP. No. 
98-225, 369-370. In United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656 
(2d Cir. 1975), the defendants conspired to bribe Pedro 
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Morales, the Assistant Administrator of the Harlem-East 
Harlem Model Cities Program, a program that wasfinanced 
and supervised by the United States Department of 
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). The federal 
government paid one hundred percent of the cost of the 
program, and eighty percent of its salaries, including 
Morales's salary. Id. at 658, 661. The defendants wanted 
Morales to use his position with the program to secure 
Model Cities an office space lease in a building for which 
one of the defendants was the rental agent. Id.  at 658. 
Because Morales was a city employee, and not a federal 
one, however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
concluded that Morales was not a "public official" for 
purposes of S 201: "We do not believe that Morales was 
acting `under or by authority of any such department, 
agency, or branch' of the federal government. He was a city 
employee, carrying out a task delegated to him by his 
superior, another city employee." Id. at 662. Yet, the federal 
interest in Morales' corrupt transaction is apparent: the 
bribed official administered a program significantly funded 
by federal monies and the bribe was related to the program 
administered by the official. 
 
In the other two decisions cited in the Senate Report, the 
Seventh Circuit determined that non-federal employees 
could be considered "public officials" for purposes of S 201, 
but this decision turned on the fact that the defendants 
exercised considerable discretion in the administration of 
federal funds and the bribery related to the defendant's 
administration of the program, which for our purpose 
suggests that a federal interest clearly was implicated. See 
United States v. Hinton, 683 F.2d 195, 198-200 (7th Cir. 
1982); United States v. Mosley, 659 F.2d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 
1981). In Hinton, the defendants were officials of United 
Neighborhoods, Inc., a non-profit corporation that had 
entered into a contract with the City of Peoria to administer 
funds that HUD awarded to Peoria. The defendants had 
discretion in administering the federal funds, and the 
federal funds paid the defendants' salaries and the entire 
cost of the program they administered. Significantly, the 
bribery related to rehabilitation contracts that fell within 
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the purview of the program and were paid with federal 
funds. Hinton, 683 F.2d at 196-99.11 
 
In Mosley, the defendant, an employee of the State of 
Illinois Bureau of Employment Security ("IBES"), was 
convicted of receiving bribes in exchange for giving 
preferential treatment to Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Programs Act ("CETA") applicants when he 
evaluated and referred applicants for CETA-funded jobs. 
Mosley, 659 F.2d at 813. The federal government funded 
the CETA program, the CETA jobs, and all of IBES's costs, 
including Mosley's salary. Id. As in Hinton, the defendants 
could be considered public officials because the program in 
Mosley was funded by the federal government, the 
defendant exercised discretion in the administration of 
federal funds, and the bribery related to the defendant's 
administration of the program. Again, the federal interest is 
clear. 
 
The Senate Report's examples of intended S 666 offenses 
involved situations in which the corrupt acts clearly 
implicated a federal interest, as the acts were closely tied to 
the funded programs.12 Another comment in the Senate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. In affirming Hinton, the Supreme Court determined that individuals 
employed by private organizations that receive federal funds may be 
covered by S 201, at least if an individual possesses "some degree of 
official responsibility for carrying out a federal program or policy." 
Dixson 
v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 499-500 (1984). In limiting the 
parameters of its holding, however, the Supreme Court cautioned: 
 
       By finding petitioners to be public officials within the meaning of 
       section 201(a), we do not mean to suggest that the mere presence of 
       some federal assistance brings a local jurisdiction and its 
employees 
       within the jurisdiction of the federal bribery statute or even that 
all 
       employees of local organizations responsible for administering 
       federal grant programs are public officials within the meaning of 
       section 201(a). To be a public official under section 201(a), an 
       individual must possess some degree of responsibility for carrying 
       out a federal program or policy . . . individuals who work for 
block 
       grant recipients and business people who provide recipients with 
       goods and services can not be said to be public officials under 
       section 201(a) unless they assume some duties of an official 
nature. 
 
Id. at 500. 
 
12. See also LaHue, 170 F.3d at 1031 ("In all three cases [Del Toro, 
Hinton, and Mosley], the organization in question received federal 
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Report illustrates that an entity's receipt of federal funds 
does not automatically establish a federal interest in 
corrupt activity of employees of that entity: 
 
       For example, if a government agency lawfully 
       purchases more than $10,000 in equipment from a 
       supplier, it is not the intent of this section to make a 
       theft of $5,000 or more from the supplier a Federal 
       crime. 
 
S. REP. NO. 98-225, 370. Thus, nothing in the legislative 
history suggests that Congress intended to go well beyond 
the examples in Del Toro, Hinton, and Mosley to make S 666 
applicable when no federal interest is implicated by certain 
offense conduct. 
 
Not only does the legislative history of S 666 lead us to 
conclude that the statute should be read to incorporate a 
federal interest requirement, but several well-established 
principles of statutory construction dictate this result. 
According to the Supreme Court, ambiguity in the language 
of a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of the 
defendant. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 
(1971) ("In various ways over the years, we have stated that 
`when choice has to be made between two readings of what 
conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, 
before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that 
Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and 
definite.' ") (quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit 
Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952)). Congress has not 
"clearly and definitely" instructed thatS 666 should be 
applied even absent some federal interest in the offense 
conduct. We should refuse the broader reading urged by 
the government and adopt the narrower construction of the 
activity criminalized by this provision. See also LaHue, 170 
F.3d at 1029 (in evaluating another subsection ofS 666, 
"we must exercise particular restraint in interpreting federal 
criminal statutes") (citing Dowling, 473 U.S. at 214). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
program funds as the intended recipient, and each was charged with the 
responsibility for administering or spending the federal grant monies to 
benefit the intended beneficiaries."). 
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The Supreme Court also has instructed us that we 
should not interpret a statute in a manner that significantly 
alters the federal-state balance unless Congress has clearly 
indicated that it intended to do so. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 
349 ("In traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation 
affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear 
statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, 
and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters 
involved in the judicial decision."); see also McCormack, 31 
F. Supp.2d at 186-187; Frega, 933 F. Supp. at 1540 (citing 
Bass). If we adopted the government's interpretation that 
S 666 requires no connection between the offense conduct 
and federal funds or programming, S 666 would criminalize 
a host of corrupt acts committed by state agents, among 
others, by virtue of the fact that all states receive at least 
$10,000 in federal funds per year. See McCormack, 31 F. 
Supp.2d at 186. This result raises significant federalism 
concerns, turning traditionally local conduct into a matter 
for federal enforcement involving a substantial extension of 
federal law enforcement resources. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 
350. We will not transform S 666 into a general federal anti- 
corruption statute when Congress has not clearly expressed 
its intention to do so. See McCormack, 31 F. Supp.2d at 
186 (expressing concern about adopting government's 
interpretation); Frega, 933 F. Supp. at 1540. As the 
Supreme Court stated in Bass, "consistent with our regard 
for the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal 
jurisdiction, our reading preserves as an element . . . a 
requirement suited to federal criminal jurisdiction alone." 
404 U.S. at 351.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. In interpreting the illegal gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. S 
201(c)(1)(A), 
Justice Scalia stated for an unanimous Court that"a statute in this field 
that can linguistically be interpreted to be either a meat axe or a 
scalpel 
should reasonably be taken to be the latter. Absent a text that clearly 
requires it, we ought not expand this one piece of the [illegal gratuity] 
regulatory puzzle so dramatically as to make many other pieces misfits." 
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S. 
Ct. 1402, 1410 (1999) (holding that S 201(c)(1)(A) requires that the 
government prove a link between a thing of value conferred upon a 
public official and a specific official act for or because of which it was 
given). We point out, however, that SS 201 and 666 are not necessarily 
parallel in their applications, so these remarks do not dictate a 
substantive outcome here. See United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 
1015 fn 4 (4th Cir. 1998) (outlining distinctions between application of 
two provisions but not deciding whether S 666, like S 201, prohibits 
gratuities). 
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Finally, when a statute is unclear, we will construe it so 
as to avoid constitutional concerns, assuming that such 
construction does not amount to a rewriting of the statute. 
See Albertini, 472 U.S. at 680. InterpretingS 666 to have no 
federal interest requirement produces serious concerns as 
to whether Congress exceeded its power under the 
Spending Clause in enacting this statute. See McCormack, 
31 F. Supp.2d at 187-89.14 To pass muster under the 
Spending Clause, legislation regulating behavior of entities 
receiving federal funds must, among other things, be based 
upon a federal interest in the particular conduct. See South 
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). Applying S 666 to 
offense conduct, absent evidence of any federal interest, 
would appear to be an unconstitutional exercise of power 
under the Spending Clause. 
 
Thus, we hold that S 666 requires that the government 
prove a federal interest is implicated by the defendant's 
offense conduct. In so holding, we part ways with the Sixth 
Circuit's holding in Dakota and agree with the result 
reached by the Second Circuit, as expressed most recently 
in Santopietro, and the District Court for the Southern 
District of California in its pre-Salinas Frega decision. 
 
Given that the Supreme Court found a sufficient federal 
connection existed in Salinas, we surmise that a highly 
attenuated implication of a federal interest will suffice for 
purposes of S 666.15 We can conceive of several ways in 
which the government could prove a federal interest in a 
S 666 in light of this threshold. The amount of federal funds 
could provide the requisite federal implication, even if the 
purpose of those funds has no explicit relationship to the 
subject of the bribe. If, for example, in a given year, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. According to the Second Circuit, "Salinas may be read to indicate 
that the `threat to the integrity and proper operation of [a] federal 
program' created by the corrupt activity is necessary to assure that the 
statute is not unconstitutionally applied." Santopietro, 166 F3d at 93 
(citing Salinas, 118 S. Ct. at 475). 
 
15. In Salinas, the Supreme Court found that the federal government's 
interest in the housing of federal prisoners in federally-funded local 
facilities was sufficiently implicated when a prison official accepts 
bribes 
from a federal prisoner in exchange for permitting the prisoner to have 
conjugal visits. See Salinas, 118 S. Ct. at 474. 
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greater part of a township's budget came from federal 
funds, bribery of a township agent for any purpose might 
be said to implicate federal interests. Absent that situation, 
the offense conduct would have to somehow implicate a 
particular substantive federal interest, as the Supreme 
Court found it did in Salinas, where federal funds were 
being provided to house federal prisoners in local prisons. 
 
Examples from other cases may be illustrative. The 
Second Circuit found a sufficient federal connection in 
Santopietro when real estate developers made corrupt 
payments to defendants to secure defendants' influence 
with city agencies overseeing housing and urban 
development programs that were the beneficiaries of federal 
funds. See Santopietro, 166 F.3d at 93 - 94. The Second 
Circuit concluded that "this is not a case where the 
transactions sought to be influenced concerned one 
department of a city and the requisite $10,000 of federal 
funds were received by a totally unrelated department." Id. 
However, the Court noted that the federal interest 
requirement "would not permit the Government to use 
section 666(a)(1)(B) to prosecute a bribe paid to a city's 
meat inspector in connection with a substantial transaction 
just because the city's parks department had received a 
federal grant of $10,000." Id., at 93. 
 
The District Court in Frega concluded that bribing state 
court judges to influence decisions in certain cases did not 
produce the requisite federal interest when California 
received federal funds for purposes not related to the state 
courts. See Frega, 933 F.Supp. at 1542 - 1543. The Court 
hypothesized, however, that some circumstances involving 
state court judges might produce the requisite federal 
connection, such as if the state court system received 
federal funding for the purpose of appointing counsel in 
death penalty habeas proceedings, and a state court judge 
accepted a bribe in exchange for appointing a particular 
attorney as habeas counsel. See id. 
 
There was evidence at Zwick's trial revealing that the 
federal funds were provided to Ross Township for 
reimbursement for emergency snow removal and funding of 
a project to prevent stream bank erosion.16 These uses bear 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. The government presented proof that Ross Township received in 
excess of $10,000 in federal funds in a one-year period from two 
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no obvious connection to Zwick's offense conduct, which 
involved sewer access, use permits and landscaping 
performance bonds. However, we will not direct the entry of 
a judgment of acquittal because the District Court ruled 
that S 666 did not require, and thus the government need 
not present proof, that Zwick's conduct implicated a federal 
interest.17 Instead, we will vacate Zwick's conviction and 
remand for a new trial. 
 
IV. 
 
Zwick raises several other challenges to his S 666 
conviction that we find to be without merit. In connection 
with the conduct charged in count one, Zwick argues that 
there was insufficient evidence establishing that he acted 
as an agent of an entity that received the requisite amount 
of federal funds as S 666 requires. Zwick contends that the 
evidence presented at trial shows that Zwick was acting as 
an agent of Lowries Run, not as an agent of Ross Township. 
The government's theory at trial was that Zwick had offered 
to obtain sewer access for Kaclik in his capacity as an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
sources. First, Ross Township applied for federal reimbursement under 
a Presidential Declaration of Major Disaster for costs associated with the 
blizzard of 1996 and consequently received $30,587 in June of 1996 
from the Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA"). The funds 
first flowed through the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency 
("PEMA"), but they were segregated from other Commonwealth funds 
prior to distribution to Ross Township. Second, the United States Army 
Corps of Engineers carried out and funded a $326,200 project, to which 
Ross Township contributed $65,300, to prevent the erosion of a stream 
bank in Ross Township. 
 
17. At a pretrial conference, counsel discussed with the District Court 
whether S 666 requires a showing of a federal interest in Zwick's 
conduct. Counsel for the government informed the District Court that 
"there are crucial issues as to what would be admissible and arguable at 
trial that turn on what the jury instructions that you issue will be. For 
example, we would need a determination on whether there does or does 
not need, as we maintain, need to be a nexus between the bribe and 
receipt of federal funds by Ross Township." App. 269. In response, the 
District Court stated at least twice that "there doesn't have to be any 
relationship." App. 270, line 9, App. 271, lines 3-4. 
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agent of Ross Township, not of Lowries Run, and the 
government did not offer any proof that Lowries Run 
received federal funds. Zwick concludes that his conviction 
on count one should be reversed. 
 
Under S 666(b), the government must establish that at 
least $10,000 in federal funds within a one-year period 
were received by the entity for which the defendant was 
acting as an agent. A defendant advancing a claim based on 
insufficiency of the evidence carries a heavy burden, as we 
apply a particularly deferential standard in reviewing this 
type of claim. United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d 
Cir. 1998). We do not weigh the evidence or determine the 
credibility of the witnesses. Id. Rather, viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the government, we will 
sustain the verdict if any rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Id. 
 
The Lowries Run Sanitary Authority ("Lowries Run") is a 
joint venture between Ross Township and the McCandless 
Township Sanitary Authority; two of the members of its 
governing board are appointed by Ross Township, and two 
are appointed by McCandless Township. Lowries Run board 
members need not be commissioners from Ross Township. 
Zwick was selected as a member of the Lowries Run board, 
but not in his capacity as a Ross Township commissioner. 
Lowries Run operates independently from Ross Township; it 
has its own bank account that is administered by the 
McCandless Sanitary Authority, and money that it receives 
belongs to Lowries Run, not Ross Township. 
 
At trial, Kaclik testified that he could have applied to 
either Ross Township or Lowries Run for sewer access for 
his project, Shannopin Square II. Kaclik testified further 
that he understood that, in exchange for his money, Zwick 
would influence Ross Township to approve Kaclik's sewer 
access application; although he had the option of tapping 
into either the Ross Township or the Lowries Run sewer 
system, he preferred the Township option because it was 
less expensive. App. 732, 758-59. Thomas D. Lavorini, 
Manager of Ross Township, testified that he believed Kaclik 
approached Ross Township about obtaining access to the 
Ross Township sewer line, and that Lavorini may have had 
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a discussion with Zwick about Kaclik's request. App. 658- 
59. Kaclik also testified that Zwick had told him he would 
obtain the necessary Republican and Democratic votes and 
that Zwick cashed Kaclik's check so that the Township 
would not know the source of the money. App. 733, 740- 
41. Both of Zwick's comments suggest Zwick was offering to 
deal with the Township, and not Lowries Run, on Kaclik's 
behalf. 
 
The substance of Kaclik's testimony suggests that he had 
some confusion regarding the difference between the 
Township and Lowries Run, and there was documentary 
evidence that the only formal application Kaclikfiled was 
with Lowries Run. App. 751-52, 761-62. However, 
assuming a jury found Kaclik and Lavorini credible, this 
evidence is not so compelling that it could have prevented 
a jury from finding, based on the evidence before it, that 
Zwick was acting as an agent of Ross Township during the 
sewer access transactions. Thus, we reject Zwick's 
argument. 
 
With respect to count two, Zwick also argues that the 
government failed to establish that Zwick intended to be 
influenced "in connection with any business, transaction, 
or series of transactions of such organization, government, 
or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or more." 
See 18 U.S.C. S 666(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). According to 
Zwick's interpretation of S 666, the transaction or 
transactions must be worth at least $5,000 to Ross 
Township, not to the other entities involved. He also claims 
that the transactions involved in count two were not worth 
$5,000 or more as S 666 requires, but rather worth only 
$700, the cost of the conditional use permit and thefinal 
site plan that Zwick offered to help the Fosnights obtain. 
 
First, we disagree with Zwick's reading of the statute 
regarding valuation of the $5,000 element. We find that the 
plain language of the statute does not require that value be 
measured from the perspective of the organization, 
government, or agency. See 18 U.S.C. S 666(a)(1)(B) 
(prohibiting bribery "in connection with any business, 
transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, 
government, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 
or more" (emphasis added)); see also Santopietro, 166 F.3d 
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at 93 ("there is no requirement that the corrupt 
transactions are worth $5,000 or more to the entity 
receiving the federal funds"); United States v. Marmolejo, 89 
F.3d 1185 (5th Cir. 1996)18 (finding that the $5,000 value 
element was designed to limit application of S 666 to 
significant corrupt transactions, not to restrict the manner 
in which or the perspective from which that value is to be 
calculated). See also United States v. Apple, 927 F. Supp. 
1119, 1126 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (concluding that the 
government is not required "to show that the thing that 
held value of over $5,000 held that value for" the entity); 
United States v. Vona, 842 F. Supp. 1534, 1536 (W.D.N.Y. 
1994) (finding that the Act does not require that the 
defendant gain $5,000 or that the victim lose $5,000, but 
that "as long as the overall transaction or the target of the 
bribe is valued at $5,000 or more, the element of the crime 
is satisfied"); United States v. Mongelli, 794 F. Supp. 529, 
530 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("The $5,000 triggering provision 
should thus be interpreted as intended to require that 
substantial matters of that actual value be involved, not 
that the agency be at risk of losing that amount.").19 
 
Second, we reject Zwick's argument that the transactions 
at issue were worth less than $5,000. Significantly, the 
Fosnights agreed to pay Zwick $15,000 for his assistance, 
which indicates that the value of the transactions was well 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. In Marmolejo, defendant local officials agreed to provide a prisoner 
with conjugal visits in exchange for $6,000 a month and $1,000 for each 
visit. Id. at 1191. To value the transactions at issue, the Court looked 
to 
"traditional valuation methods," specifically, what a person in the 
marketplace would be willing to pay for the transaction. Id. at 1193. 
 
19. We also reject Zwick's argument that we should follow the Second 
Circuit in requiring that the value be determined from Ross Township's 
perspective. For this argument, Zwick relies on the Second Circuit's 
ruling in Foley that the transaction must be valued from the perspective 
of the entity receiving the funds. Foley, 73 F.3d at 493. Regardless of 
the 
merits of Zwick's claim, the Second Circuit has since abandoned that 
construction. See Santopietro, 166 F.3d at 93 ("[T]o the extent that Foley 
required the Government to plead and prove that the transaction 
involved something of value to the governmental entity that received the 
requisite amount of federal funds, that narrowing construction of the 
statute must . . . be discarded."). Thus, Zwick's reliance on Foley is 
misplaced. 
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above $700 and the $5,000 minimum. App. 424 - 425. See 
Marmolejo, 89 F.3d at 1194 (finding that the value of the 
conjugal visits was more than $5,000, because the prisoner 
was willing to pay $6,000 a month plus $1,000 per visit for 
them). There was evidence at trial that the Fosnights would 
have lost the $10,000 they paid to the owners of the 
property had their conditional use permit not been 
approved. App. 420-21, 465. The overall value of the 
Fosnight project was $4.6 million, and Ross Township 
would receive $90,000 in tax benefits from the project on a 
yearly basis, as well as $6,939 in permit fees before the 
project could go forward. App. 439, 442. The Fosnight 
project was clearly a significant transaction within the 
intended reach of the statute. Because we believe that there 
was substantial evidence from which the jury could have 
found that the $5,000 element was satisfied, we reject 
Zwick's challenge to the calculation of value underS 666 
with respect to count two. 
 
We also are not persuaded by Zwick's argument, 
applicable to all counts, that the District Court improperly 
instructed the jury that the future value of the transaction 
can be taken into account. Zwick cites the Sixth Circuit's 
decision in Valentine that the government could not 
aggregate the values of numerous thefts that occurred over 
a three-year period in order to meet the $5,000 threshold 
under S 666(a)(1)(A), the theft provision. See Valentine, 63 
F.3d at 464. Valentine is simply inapposite. Under the theft 
provision, the stolen property must be worth $5,000, while 
the bribery provision looks to the value of the underlying 
business or transaction. Compare 18 U.S.C.S 666(a)(1)(A) 
(prohibiting theft of "property that . . . is valued at $5,000 
or more") with 18 U.S.C. S 666(a)(1)(B) (prohibiting bribery 
"in connection with any business, transaction, or series of 
transactions of such organization, government, or agency 
involving anything of value of $5,000 or more"). Further, 
unlike in Valentine, the government in this case did not 
attempt to proffer evidence of the value of transactions or 
business outside of the statutory period in order to satisfy 
the $5,000 threshold. Here, the references to Ross 
Township's future revenues from the transactions were 
actually evidence of their current value. Even without 
reference to future revenues, there is substantial evidence 
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establishing that the present value of the transactions and 
business involved in each of counts one, two, and three was 
at least $5,000. The sewer taps that Zwick offered to obtain 
for Kaclik were clearly worth more than $5,000, as Kaclik 
was willing to pay $17,500 to ensure that he received them; 
the contracts that were the subject of the bribery at count 
three were worth $45,000; and the permits in count two 
were worth more than $5,000 to the Fosnights, because, as 
detailed above, they were willing to pay Zwick $15,000 to 
ensure that they received them and would have lost 
$10,000 if they did not receive them in a timely manner. 
 
V. 
 
Zwick's final contention is that the District Court erred in 
failing to award him an additional point reduction in his 
offense level for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1(b). We give great deference to the District 
Court's evaluation of the defendant's acceptance of 
responsibility, but exercise plenary review of the Court's 
construction of S 3E1.1. See United States v. Ceccarani, 98 
F.3d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1996). We review the District Court's 
determinations of fact for clear error. Id. 
 
Section 3E1.1 provides: 
 
       (a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptan ce of 
       responsibility for this offense, decrease the offense level 
       by 2 levels. 
 
       (b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease un der 
       subsection (a), the offense level determined prior to the 
       operation of subsection (a) is level 16 or greater, and 
       the defendant has assisted authorities in the 
       investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by 
       taking one or more the following steps: 
 
       (1) timely providing complete information to the 
       government concerning his own involvement in the 
       offense; or 
 
       (2) timely notifying authorities of his intention to 
       enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the 
       government to avoid preparing for trial and 
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       permitting the court to allocate its resources 
       efficiently, 
 
       decrease the offense level by 1 additional level. 
 
The District Court awarded Zwick the two-point 
reduction provided in S 3E1.1(a). At issue here is the 
Court's rejection of the one-point reduction under 
S 3E1.1(b). Section 3E1.1(b) focuses on the timeliness of a 
defendant's offer of information or notice of intent to plead 
such that the defendant provides an opportunity to the 
government and court to conserve resources. See U.S.S.G. 
S 3E1.1, App. Note 6 ("For example, to qualify under 
subsection (b)(2), the defendant must have notified 
authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty at a 
sufficiently early point in the process . . . ."); United States 
v. Narramore, 36 F.3d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The 
additional reduction in section (b) with which we are 
concerned, is unlike the initial reduction in section (a), for 
it does not rest upon the demonstration of contrition. 
Section (b) allows the defendant to earn an additional 
reduction by providing timely notice of his intention to 
plead guilty, and it thus creates an incentive for an early 
plea"). 
 
Parsing section 3E1.1(b), it directs the sentencing judge 
to decrease the offense level by one additional level if 1) the 
defendant is entitled to the two-point reduction under 
S 3E1.1(a); 2) the defendant's offense level is 16 or greater; 
and 3) the defendant satisfies either of the two 
requirements provided in subparagraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2). 
See United States v. Paster, 173 F.3d 206, 214-15 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
 
Zwick clearly satisfied the first two conditions under 
subsection (b), in that he was awarded the two-point 
reduction under S 3E1.1(a), and had an offense level of 22.20 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Although the government argues in its brief that "it is difficult if 
not 
impossible, to find acceptance of responsibility in Zwick's pretrial and 
trial conduct," see Brief for Appellee at 53, we limit our discussion to 
whether Zwick satisfied either subparagraph (1) or (2) of S 3E1.1(b) 
because acceptance of responsibility is not the element at issue in this 
appeal and we assume it will be satisfied even after remand. In addition, 
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However, the District Court adopted the Probation Office's 
conclusion that Zwick was not entitled to the extra point 
under subsection (b) because the government was required 
to prepare for trial,21 noting also that defendant made 
factual arguments at trial.22 
 
We believe that the District Court did not fully consider 
the elements of subsection (b). To receive an additional 
reduction for timely providing complete information to the 
government, subparagraph one of S 3E1.1(b) requires that 
the defendant timely provide complete information; it does 
not require, either expressly or impliedly, that the 
defendant actually forego his trial. See S 3E1.1(b)(1) 
(providing for a reduction for a defendant for "timely 
providing complete information to the government 
concerning his own involvement in the offense"). Instead of 
concluding that the one-point deduction was foreclosed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
we also assume that, even after remand, Zwick's offense level will be at 
level 16 or greater as subsection (b) requires. Although Zwick's offense 
level may change if the District Court determines on remand that the 
judgment on the S 666 counts is to be vacated, the offense level for the 
fraud counts alone is 17, which satisfies the second requirement of 
S 3E1.1(b) that Zwick's offense level be 16 or higher. 
 
21. The Probation Office, in its Presentence Investigative Report ("PSR") 
found: 
 
       The defendant entered a guilty plea to Counts 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10 
       of the indictment. Ostensibly, he chose to go to trial over the 
       remaining counts of the indictment, believing he should not have 
       been charged with those offenses in federal court, instead that he 
       should have been charged in state court. During the presentence 
       interview, he admitted his conduct in all of the charged counts was 
       illegal. The government was, therefore, required to prepare for 
trial 
       in this matter. In view of this, only a two-point reduction for 
       acceptance of responsibility is warranted. 
 
PSR P 75. 
 
22. Specifically, the District Court noted that the defendant's opening 
statement informed the jury that the government had to prove 
defendant's intent, and that defendant cross-examined Tim Fosnight as 
to the defendant's voting activities at a Ross Township Planning 
Commission hearing on the approval of a conditional use permit for the 
Fosnights' project in an effort to require the government to prove intent. 
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simply because the government prepared for trial, the 
District Court should have considered whether Zwick timely 
provided complete information as the Guideline requires. 
 
Likewise, subparagraph two of S 3E1.1(b) requires that 
the defendant express his notice of intent to plead guilty 
early enough to permit the court and government to 
conserve resources, not that a guilty plea be entered in a 
timely fashion or that the reduction is unavailable if the 
case proceeds to trial. See S 3E1.1(b)(2). Permitting the 
government and court to conserve resources, see  WEBSTER'S 
II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 876 (defining "permit" 
as "[t]o afford opportunity"), is not synonymous with the 
actual conservation of resources. We recognize that other 
courts, such as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
require actual conservation of resources as a condition to 
receiving the point deduction under subsection (b)(2). See 
United States v. Wilson, 134 F.3d 855, 872 (7th Cir. 1998) 
("courts are still required to consider whether this 
expressed intent actually resulted in conserving 
Government and court resources."). However, we believe 
that our reading is true to the plain language of the 
Guideline and comports with the underlying purpose the 
Guideline serves. This Guideline rewards the defendant's 
willingness to acknowledge responsibility for criminal 
wrongdoing in lieu of requiring all allegations to be proved 
in a trial. As such, the Guideline is triggered by the 
defendant's behavior, not by whether other factors out of 
the defendant's control prevent the acceptance of the 
defendant's plea. Surely the possibility of an extra point 
reduction is not necessarily foreclosed, for instance, by the 
government's rejection of a plea, for whatever reason. The 
government's refusal to accept the plea and to avail itself of 
the opportunity to conserve resources is not a per se 
barrier to the one-point deduction. If the drafters of the 
Guideline intended to limit the award of the point to 
situations in which a plea was entered, or resources were 
actually conserved, they could have crafted the language to 
reflect this intention. 
 
We recognize that conditional pleas raise unique issues, 
which need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 23 We 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. See United States v. Rogers, 129 F.3d 76, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(finding that conditional offer to plead guilty did not come early enough 
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also acknowledge that it may be a rare case in which 
anything short of a timely entry of a guilty plea suffices for 
purposes of S 3E1.1(b).24 However, because the District 
 
Court did not fully address, let alone resolve, whether 
Zwick's pre-trial activity entitled him to a reduction under 
the specific terms of S 3E1.1(b), we will remand to the 
District Court for consideration of whether Zwick timely 
provided complete information to the government under 
S 3E1.1(b)(1), or if his expression of his intent to plead 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
in the proceedings to satisfy S 3E1.1(b)(2) because it came after the case 
was "effectively tried" with the motion to suppress); United States v. 
Gonzales, 19 F.3d 982, 983-84 (5th Cir. 1994) (refusing to award an 
additional point because Gonzales never entered an actual guilty plea; 
the suppression hearing to which Gonzales wished to preserve a 
challenge in his guilty plea was the equivalent of a full trial, requiring 
full preparation and expenditure of resources by the government and the 
court). 
 
24. See United States v. Morillo, 8 F.3d 864, 872 (1st Cir. 1993) ("A 
defendant who withholds a guilty plea until he stands poised on the 
brink of trial has no entitlement to the soothing unguent of section 
3E1.1(b)(2). Therefore, the court below acted appropriately in awarding 
appellant a two-level, rather than a three-level, decrease for acceptance 
of responsibility"); Narramore, 36 F.3d at 846-47 (holding that defendant 
was not entitled to a reduction under S 3E1.1(b)(2) because he could 
have informed government of intention to plead guilty, even though he 
was waiting to actually plead guilty until after the court ruled on his 
motion to suppress); United States v. Villasenor-Cesar, 114 F.3d 970, 
975 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Like Narramore, Villasenor-Cesar could have 
preserved the availability of the subsection (b)(2) adjustment if, instead 
of pursuing a stipulated-facts trial, he had notified authorities of his 
intent to plead guilty if the district court ruled against him on his 
motion 
to dismiss the indictment."); United States v. Covarrubias, 65 F.3d 1362, 
1368 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Because defendant made no attempt to conserve 
government and district court resources in his case prior to November 7, 
the district court did not clearly err in denying him the additional 
reduction" when defendant did not plead guilty until the day of trial, and 
did not inform the government that he would be pleading guilty in the 
event that the motion to suppress, which was decided on the morning of 
trial, was denied); United States v. Williams , 74 F.3d 654, 657 (5th Cir. 
1996) (agreeing with Covarrubias). 
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guilty was sufficiently timely under S 3E1.1(b)(2) to permit 
the conservation of government and court resources. 25 
 
VI. 
 
For all of the foregoing reasons, we will remand this 
matter to the District Court for a new trial. We also will 
vacate the District Court's sentencing decision denying the 
additional one-point reduction under S 3E1.1(b), and 
remand to the District Court so that it may determine if 
Zwick is entitled to a reduction under S 3E1.1(b) for timely 
providing information to the government, or timely offering 
notice of intent to plead guilty. We reject Zwick's other 
contentions, and will affirm as to those issues. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. We also find that the fact that Zwick made legal arguments at trial 
is inapposite with respect to S 3E1.1(b). Application Note two provides 
that a defendant may be entitled to a reduction even if he goes to trial, 
if he does so to "assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual 
guilt (e.g., to make a constitutional challenge to a statute or a 
challenge 
to the applicability of a statute to his conduct)." Although the note does 
not explicitly provide that it applies only to S 3E1.1(a), a logical 
reading 
of the note compels this conclusion. The note espouses the principle that 
a defendant may in some circumstances show contrition even if he 
proceeds to trial; this has little to do with the timeliness of a 
defendant's 
offer of information or expression of intent to plead guilty, the focus of 
S 3E1.1(b). See Villasenor-Cesar, 114 F.3d at 974. In addition, the note 
is essentially a continuation of Application Note 1, which applies to 
subsection (a). 
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